This paper examines the emerging Information Warfare (IW) capabilities of the United States’ defense and security estates and provides a framework for the conceptual boundaries of these much-debated methodologies.

The author specifically relates the tactics and techniques of Information Warfare to more traditional forms of military employment and notes its current “force multiplier” doctrinal relevance to those who command military forces. Information Warfare processes and procedures are operationally defined in terms of their relevance to the family of products and services known to the warfighter as C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computer & Intelligence) and the potential usefulness of IW capabilities in terms of the admittedly situational strategy of “control” or compellance – i.e. significantly reducing the ability of an opposing force to engage in military activity – is addressed.

The author concludes with a section discussing the implications of Information Warfare capabilities for national and regional national security decision makers.